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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Some organizations are designed as hierarchies, with each subordinate reporting to only one su-
perior. Others adopt a matrix structure, with each subordinate directly reporting to two or more
superiors. If one views subordinates as agents and superiors as principals, the choice between these
two organizational structures can also be seen as a choice between one or multiple principals.
Perhaps the most natural application of the multiprincipal or common agency approach to
incentive problems is in the study of the organization of governments. For example, Martimort
(1996) analyzes the tradeoﬀ between having one or multiple regulators for the same ﬁrm. With
multiple regulators, the risk of capture of the regulatory process is low, but the power of the
incentives provided to the regulated ﬁrm is also low. Diﬀerently from Martimort, who focuses on
hidden information problems, Dixit (1996) analyzes the multiprincipal nature of government in a
standard moral hazard setup. He shows that the power of the incentives provided to the agent is
decreasing in the number of principals.
Although there is a clear analogy between these examples and the choice of structures in other
types of organizations such as ﬁrms, the organizational design literature in economics has largely
ignored the common agency element implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix struc-
tures. For example, Harris and Raviv (2002) study the choice between hierarchical and matrix
structures based on the tradeoﬀ between the beneﬁts of coordinating diﬀerent activities and the
cost of using managers’ time. However, they do not compare the two organizational structures in
terms of their incentive characteristics. In contrast, our goal is to model the choice between hierar-
chical and matrix structures when these two structures provide diﬀerent incentives for lower-level
agents.
We adopt the same setup as in Dixit (1996), which is actually a multiprincipal version of the well-
known Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987, 1991) linear contracts model. Consider a situation in which an
agent must exert eﬀort into many diﬀerent activities. There might be either one or many principals
who may beneﬁt from the outcome generated by the agent’s eﬀort. Dixit (1996) is concerned with
comparing a situation in which many principals compete with each other by oﬀering incentive
contracts to the agent, each one caring about only one of the activities, with a situation in which
the same principals collude and oﬀer a single contract to the agent. This modeling strategy is well
suited for Dixit’s purpose, which is to explain the perceived low power of incentives provided to
government agencies, taking the multiprincipal nature of political representation as given. However,
this approach does not appear to be useful in explaining organizational design, because the outcome
under collusion always dominates the case in which principals compete, implying that there is no
tradeoﬀ between the two cases. Thus, in order for this approach to have any explanatory power for
organizational design, collusion among principals cannot be possible.
We modify Dixit’s setup in the following manner. We assume that the organizational designer’s
task is to choose the number of principals for a given agent, but principals are unable to collude
2and write binding agreements with each other. We then show that the choice between hierarchical
(one principal) and matrix (many principals) structures depends crucially on the biases of the
potential principals. If principals’ preferences are such that they are heavily biased towards some
activities, the hierarchical structure performs poorly because the single principal’s bias will distort
the incentive schedule oﬀered to the agent towards her preferred activity, leading to an unbalanced
distribution of incentives across activities. In such a case, the matrix structure might be preferable,
because competition among principals partially oﬀsets the eﬀect of their individual biases on the
incentive structure as perceived by the agent. However, the matrix structure leads to the traditional
kind of distortions associated with common agency problems: the power of incentives might be too
low under many principals, an eﬀect emphasized by Martimort (1996) and Dixit (1996), or it
might also be too high, as we will show below. In either case, common agency generically leads to
incentives that are either too weak or too strong. We conclude by arguing that our approach can
be used to describe the choice between hierarchical and matrix structures as a tradeoﬀ between the
strength and the balance of the incentives they provide to lower-level managers or workers.
2M o d e l
For simplicity, we consider the case in which the ﬁnal organizational outcome is the sum of the
realization of two random variables (activities), x1 and x2. There is one agent who may exert eﬀort
into each activity (or task), t1 and t2. The technology can be expressed as x = t + e,w h e r ex,
t,a n de are 2-dimensional vectors, and e is an error term which is normally distributed with zero
mean and a diagonal variance matrix Ω. Moreover, we assume that the errors have the same ﬁnite
variance σ. We impose equality of variances in order to focus only on asymmetries arising from
managers’ biases.
The utility function of the agent has the property of constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA)
and is given by
u(w,t)=−exp(−r[w − c(t)]), (1)
where w is the compensation paid to the agent, c(t) i st h ec o s to ft h ee ﬀort exerted by the agent
and r is the agent’s absolute risk-aversion coeﬃcient. We assume that the cost of eﬀort takes
a quadratic form 1
2t0Ct , where the matrix C is positive deﬁnite with positive cross-terms. For
simplicity, we set the elements in the main diagonal to 1 and the oﬀ-diagonal terms to s ∈ (0,1).
This normalization implies that the two eﬀorts are substitutes.
The organizational designer wants to maximize the expected organizational proﬁt (or welfare),
E (x1 + x2 − w). This can be seen as standard proﬁts in case the organization is a ﬁrm, but it
also admits other interpretations, such as social welfare, in the case of designing the structure of
government agencies. We assume that the designer cannot run the organization herself.
If the designer can hire a manager with preferences aligned with the organizational objectives,
3the solution to this problem is straightforward: the manager oﬀers a standard linear contract to the
agent as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and the second-best outcome is achieved. However, we
assume that this alternative is usually not available: it is either impossible or prohibitively costly to
fully align managers’ interests with organizational goals. This assumption is perhaps most natural
in the organization of government, but it is also reasonable for proﬁt-maximizing organizations.
For many reasons, such as private nonpecuniary beneﬁts from performing some activities, the
consumption of perks, or concerns about career development, managers might be naturally biased
towards one of the two activities. Thus, we assume that contracts that would completely eliminate
managerial biases are not available.
In order to focus only on the essentials, we assume that the task of the designer is simply to
choose between hiring one or two managers to act as principals for the agent, taking the managers’
preferences as givens. We ignore the costs arising from managerial compensation, although this
assumption is clearly not essential.
We model the lack of congruence between managerial and organizational objectives in the
following manner. Although the organization proﬁti sg i v e nb yi0x−w,w h e r ei is a vector of ones,
a manager’s expected utility is given by b0x − w, where the vector b may not be a vector of ones.
Managers may have diﬀerent preferences with respect to the beneﬁts of each activity. This is
crucial for the results that follow: the designer can exploit the heterogeneity in managerial biases
to achieve a more balanced incentive structure for the agent.
The optimal solution to the organizational design problem obviously depends on the underlying
distribution of managers’ types in the population. We will only analyze a very simple and symmetric
case in which managers can be of one of only two possible types (or styles). We choose this case in
order to better illustrate the eﬀect we are emphasizing in this paper; it is not meant to be realistic.
Deﬁnition 1 Let v ∈ [0,1]. A manager is of “type 1” if she has a vector of beneﬁts given by
b1 =[1 v ] and of “type 2” if her vector of beneﬁts is given by b2 =[v 1].
The symmetry implied by this deﬁnition makes the interpretation of the results that follow
much easier than in an “asymmetric” case. However, our results are also robust to cases in which
each type has a diﬀerent v. The advantage of the symmetric case comes from the fact that biases
can be deﬁned by only one parameter:
Deﬁnition 2 We say that a manager is “biased towards activity j” if she is of type j and v<1.
Moreover, the level of managerial bias is given by θ =1− v.
We have now all the elements to solve the organizational design problem. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a ta
hierarchical structure is chosen. The (single) principal will therefore be biased towards one activity.
Whether the manager is of type 1 or 2 is immaterial. Because we are assuming that eﬀort levels
are not observable, the principal has to oﬀer compensation contracts to the agent that are both
4incentive compatible and individually rational. The outside utility of the agent is normalized to
−1.
We omit most of the steps in the derivation of the optimal linear contracts, because these
are already fairly known in the literature spurred by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1991). The
manager will oﬀer a compensation schedule w = α0x + β to the agent, where α is a 2-dimensional
vector and β is a ﬁxed transfer.
The optimal bonus schedule chosen by the manager (the principal) will be
αh =( I + rCΩ)
−1 bj (2)
where bj is the vector of beneﬁts of the manager if she is of type j and αh denotes the optimal
solution under a hierarchical structure.










Finally, the expected organizational proﬁt under a hierarchical structure is given by
Lh =( i − αh)
0 C−1αh − βh. (4)
We note that when the bias is zero (θ =0 ) , the expressions above characterize the second-
best solution from the organization’s standpoint (the ﬁrst-best solution is obtained only if eﬀort is
observable). In what follows, we denote the second-best outcomes by αs,βs and Ls.
Our ﬁrst Proposition is then straightforward:
Proposition 1 Under a hierarchical structure, expected organizational proﬁt is strictly decreasing
(and concave) in the level of managerial bias.
This Proposition simply states the intuitive result that, as the manager’s interests become more
aligned with the organization’s interests, organizational proﬁti n c r e a s e s .
Consider now the case of a matrix structure. We assume that managers’ types are observable.
In such a case, if the designer chooses to hire two managers of the same type, proﬁts will always be
lower than under a hierarchical structure. Thus, the relevant case is the one in which the designer
chooses one manager of each type.
Each manager will simultaneously and non-cooperatively oﬀer a compensation schedule wj =
α0
jx+βj to the agent, j =1 ,2. The aggregate incentive schedule in a Nash equilibrium, as perceived
by the agent, is denoted by αm = α1 + α2 and βm = β1 + β2.
Solving for the equilibrium aggregate schedule gives us
αm =( I +2 rCΩ)
−1 (b1 + b2). (5)
5We note that we obtain the solution in Dixit (1996) as a particular case of our setup; when managers
are totally biased (θ =1 ) ,w eg e tαm =( I +2 rCΩ)
−1 i, which implies that incentives are too low-
powered if compared with the second-best solution, which is αs =( I + rCΩ)
−1 i.
In our setup, it is no longer true that common agency would lead to low-powered incentives,
as in Dixit (1996) and Martimort (1996). If biases are suﬃciently low, common agency distortions
take the form of excessively high-powered incentives, as compared to the ones obtained in the
second-best solution. What remains true is the fact that common agency in general distorts the
power of incentives in both activities. Unlike the case of a hierarchical structure, this distortion is
symmetric: incentives in both activities are either too low or too high as compared to their optimal
levels. In this sense, incentives under a matrix structure are more balanced across activities than
the ones under a hierarchical structure. However, their average power is generically too high or too
low.
The following Proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 2 Under a matrix structure, the power of the incentive schedule strictly decreases
with the level of bias in both activities. If managers are not biased, the power of the incentive
schedule is above the optimal level, and if managers are fully biased, the power is below the optimal
level.










and the expected organizational proﬁti sg i v e nb y
Lm =( i − αm)
0 C−1αm − βm. (7)
The next Proposition describes how proﬁts change in response to changes in managerial biases.
Proposition 3 Under a matrix structure, there is a unique level of bias (θ∗) for which the orga-
nizational proﬁt (Lm) reaches its optimal level (Ls).I fθ<θ ∗, organizational proﬁti si n c r e a s i n g
in the level of bias. If θ>θ ∗, organizational proﬁt is decreasing in the level of bias.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When biases are high, the traditional weakening-
incentives eﬀect of common agency problems is in place, thus by reducing the bias one is able
to increase the power of incentives in both activities, increasing total proﬁts. However, if biases
are suﬃciently low, common agency leads to a situation in which both principals care too much
about both activities, resulting in a compensation schedule in which incentives are too strong. This
reduces proﬁts because excessive payments are made to the agents.
We ﬁnally state our main result:
6Proposition 4 There is a unique level of bias θ such that :
if θ>θ, the matrix structure is optimal;
if θ<θ, the hierarchical structure is optimal;
if θ = θ, both the matrix and the hierarchical structures are optimal.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of this last result.
3F i n a l r e m a r k s
We interpret our main result as an illustration of the tradeoﬀ between the strength and the balance
of the incentives implied by the choice between hierarchical and matrix structures. When man-
agerial biases towards certain activities are substantial, the more balanced nature of the incentives
generated by a matrix structure becomes more valuable. On the other hand, when managerial
biases are not a major concern, common agency distortions on the level of incentives make matrix
structures less attractive.
7AA p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1





(1 + 2rσ + r2σ2 − r2s2σ2)(s2 − 1)





(1 + 2rσ + r2σ2 − r2s2σ2)(s2 − 1)
< 0.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
From equation (5) we get
∂αm(i)
∂θ = −1
2rsσ+2rσ+1 < 0 for i =1 ,2. Moreover, it is easy to see that
αm (i)|θ=0 =
2
2rsσ +2 rσ +1
>
1





2rsσ +2 rσ +1
<
1
rsσ + rσ +1
= αs(i) for i =1 ,2.
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The expected organizational proﬁt under a matrix structure is given by
Lm = −
(θ − 2)(rsσθ +2 rsσ + θ + rσθ +2 rσ)
(s + 1)(2rsσ +2 rσ +1 ) 2 .




θ(rsσ +1+rσ) − 1
(s + 1)(2rsσ +2 rσ +1 ) 2.
Therefore if θ(rsσ +1+rσ) < 1, then ∂Lm
∂θ > 0; if θ(rsσ +1+rσ) > 1, then ∂Lm
∂θ < 0; and if
θ(rsσ +1+rσ)=1 , then ∂Lm





(s +1 ) ( 2 rsσ +2 rσ +1 ) 2 < 0 for all θ ∈ [0,1].
Plugging θ = θ∗ in Lm reveals that Lm (θ∗)=Ls. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Deﬁne Y (θ)=Lh(θ) − Lm (θ). Initially, set θ =0 .T h e r e f o r e
Y (0) =
1
(2rsσ +2 rσ +1 ) 2(s +1 ) ( rsσ + rσ +1 )
> 0,
implying that the hierarchical structure dominates the matrix structure when the bias is zero. Now
set θ =1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,
8Y (1) =
2r3σ3(s4 +4 s3 +6 s2 +4 s +1 )+2 r2σ2(3s3 +5 s2 +5 s +3 )+rσ(s2 +4 s +5 )+1
−2(1 + 2rσ + r2σ2 − r2s2σ2)(2rsσ +2 rσ +1 ) 2(1 − s2)
< 0,
implying that the matrix structure dominates when the bias is 1. Notice that the function Y (θ) is
continuous (and diﬀerentiable). It is known that Y (0) > 0 and Y (1) < 0, thus the Intermediate
Value Theorem guarantees that there is at least one θ ∈ [0,1] such that Y (θ)=0 . Simple inspection
reveals that Y (θ) is quadratic, thus there are at most two values of θ such that Y (θ)=0 . Because
Y (0) > 0 and Y (1) < 0, only one of these points belongs to the interval [0,1].T h u s ,w ed e ﬁne θ




=0 , which completes the proof. ¥
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